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Abstract: The ŵedia has ƌeĐeŶtlǇ giǀe ŵuĐh atteŶtioŶ of the ͚stealthiŶg͛ tƌeŶd; uŶdisĐlosed ĐoŶdoŵ 
removal during sex, and how this may affect consent to sexual activity. This paper seeks to discuss 
where situations like this sit within the Sexual Offenses Act 2003, and how it may compare to other 
instances of consent gained in deceitful circumstances. 
Introduction 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 offered transformation rather than mere reform of the rules regarding 
consent. The foundations of such change lay with a desire to give a clear and unambiguous 
interpretation of the very core of sexual offences. The law in England and Wales interprets rape as a 
crime of violation of autonomy rather than violence. However, without force it is much harder to 
prove, leaving a gap between principle and practice,1 where physical evidence appears to be vital.2 
Jurors expect to see evidence of a struggle, ďased upoŶ ƌape ŵǇths peƌpetuated ďǇ the ͚stƌaŶgeƌ 
daŶgeƌ͛ lessoŶ ŵost leaƌŶ as ĐhildƌeŶ.3 This may account for the spectacularly low conviction rate,4 
desĐƌiďed as ͚uŶjustifiaďlǇ loǁ͛,5 which is not unique to England and wales.6 
In reality, the cases featuring circumstances of the s75 provisions7 are much more obvious to the lay 
person as rape – a person tied up, threatened with force, or unconscious. The real problems of legal 
discourse surround cases of consent given in uninformed circumstances. If one party deceives the 
other about a particular circumstance or detail, does this negate consent, and does the same apply 
for withheld information? In the twenty first century, we have come to presume that modern sexual 
relationships should be founded on mutual respect and understanding.8 How is this possible without 
the truth? The difference between a legal act and one that carries a very serious custodial sentence 
is this one single concept; a line drawn between legal and illegal, the moral and the immoral.9 
Consent takes centre stage.10 What is less clear about the concept of consent is the information 
Ŷeeded to ŵake a deĐisioŶ ǁith the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐapaĐitǇ͛ section 74 refers to.11  
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It is speculated that who the person is, what the act is, and the consequences of the act are the 
essential ingredients to informed consent.12 For this reason, we have conclusive presumptions that 
vitiate consent in such circumstances, contained within section 76. If you are impersonating a person 
known to the victim, or deceitful as to the nature or purpose of the act, any consent gained under 
suĐh ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes is Ŷot ǀalid iŶ laǁ, aŶd ǁithout defeŶĐe. If aŶǇ of these ͚iŶgƌedieŶts͛ aƌe ǁithheld 
purposely by the accused for the purpose of obtaining consent to a sexual act, this is a very active 
deception.13 Herring advanced a very robust idea for moving forward in this area, asking if the 
aĐĐused͛s aĐt ǁas that ǁhiĐh the ǀiĐtiŵ ĐoŶseŶted to, ƌatheƌ thaŶ if the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ŵistake ǀitiated 
consent. Essentially, did the victim know what they were consenting to, rather than did they say 
yes.14 This fƌaŵeǁoƌk ǁould ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ see the ͚stealthiŶg͛ Đases pƌoseĐuted, ǁheƌe the ǀiĐtiŵ does 
not know that they are involved in an act of unprotected sex. This Ŷe ͚seǆ tƌeŶd͛ has had ǁidespƌead 
media attention in recent months.15 One victim of an act of stealthing called the activity that took 
plaĐe ͞suĐh a ďlataŶt ǀiolatioŶ of ǁhat ǁe͛d agƌeed to͟ iŶ that it had ďƌokeŶ the ďouŶdaƌǇ that she 
had set.16 Without HeƌƌiŶg͛s legal ideals, this is Ŷot a section 76 act of deception, but a possible 
ƌeŵoǀal of the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐapaĐitǇ to Đhoose ǁhetheƌ to ĐoŶseŶt. Brodsky argues that 
those accused of stealthing are acting from the ideology that male supremacy and violence are a 
ŵaŶ͛s ͚Ŷatuƌal ƌight͛,17 uŶaǁaƌe that this Ŷeǁ ͚seǆ tƌeŶd͛ is aĐtuallǇ seǆual assault.18 Unfortunately, it 
appears not everyone without the criminal justice process may be on the same page when it comes 
to valid consent in such situations, with one victim referring to the police asking if they could bring in 
the ŵaŶ to ͚giǀe hiŵ a sĐaƌe͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ pƌess Đharges which might ruin his life, a possible result of 
those ever-present rape myths contaminating law enforcement officials.19 
Herring likens deceit to violence, in that it manipulates the victim into acting against their will by 
restricting the viable options available.20 It is true that in law, force and fraud are generally treated 
as equivalents (in property offences, for instance).21 Stannard summed up the difference between 
the two: 
͞Where ĐoŶseŶt is oďtaiŶed ďǇ threats, ǁe are iŶ the eŵotioŶal realŵ of fear: ǁhere it is oďtaiŶed ďǇ 
iŶduĐeŵeŶts, ǁe are iŶ the eŵotioŶal realŵ of hope͟.22 
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HeƌƌiŶg͛s idea has not been without criticism,23 with Gross conversing that section 76 was never 
meant to cover cases of misrepresentation of feelings or small lies as part of persuasion and 
͚gaŵďits iŶ a gaŵe of seduĐtioŶ͛.24 Hoǁ this fits ǁith ƌape͛s siŵplistiĐ idea of ͚ŶoŶ-consensual 
peŶetƌatioŶ͛ is uŶĐleaƌ.25 Essentially, the harm caused by breaking the boundaries of any consent 
given to a sexual act is an abuse of trust, which proves to be disempowering and demeaning to the 
victim,26 with one partner violating the rights of the other.27 As Schulhofer has shrewdly observed: 
͞“eǆual autoŶoŵǇ, like eǀerǇ other freedoŵ, is ŶeĐessarilǇ liŵited ďǇ the rights of others͟.28 
We have the right to have sexual relations with a partner, and we have the right to refuse. 
Neǀeƌtheless, ǁe ŵust ĐouŶteƌ the Đultuƌe of ͚Ŷo ŵeaŶs Ŷo͛ ďǇ also ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that ͚Ǉes ŵeans 
Ǉes͛.29 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 gave new life to our piecemeal combination of common law and 
statute to some of the most heinous crimes a person can commit. For consent, no longer could the 
accused rely on an honest but unreasonable belief that their victim consented. Instead, we have a 
law that requires a person has freedom and capacity to make a choice, with the accused having a 
defence only if they had a reasonable belief that their victim consented, and had taken all steps30 
necessary to ascertain this. Along with this, an exhaustive list of rebuttable presumptions is given as 
to situations where consent will be presumed to be absent or invalid. Lastly, the evasive conclusive 
presumptions, which appear to be rarely satisfied.31 Why any of these presumptions about consent 
were needed is a mystery, as it is unlikely judge and jury would find valid consent in a situation 
where a person was subject to violence, drugged, threatened, falsely imprisoned, or lied to about 
the nature of the act. Inclusive conduct models can be troublesome, which Scotland recognised by 
giving a non-exhaustive list of compromised free agreement situations.32 However, Gross referred to 
the need for such descriptive provisions stemming from finding a balance between protecting 
ǁoŵeŶ aŶd Ŷot ͚iŶteƌfeƌiŶg ǁith haƌŵless pleasuƌes͛.33 
With the new structured model for consent, the move toward the law encompassing respect for an 
iŶdiǀidual͛s deĐisioŶ to ǁithhold seǆual aĐtiǀitǇ seeŵs to haǀe ďeeŶ ƌealised.34 After all, the right to 
consent to something is redundant without the right to refuse, for any reason or even for none at 
all.35 Though the law is expected to be a realm of reason, the emotions influencing human behaviour 
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are of equal importance.36 What must be distinguished is regrettable consent, as repentant feelings 
towards a decision made does not negate the reason for the decision at the time. As Stannard 
states: 
 ͞EŵotioŶs haǀe a Ŷuŵďer of diŵeŶsioŶs to theŵ, iŶĐludiŶg those of teŵporal duratioŶ͟.37 
The difference lies between a person who regrets consenting the next day as to spur of the moment 
emotions which were, in retrospect, regrettable, and the person who would not have consented in 
the first instance had the true facts of the situation been disclosed to them. These two state of 
affairs must be distinguished, in order to avoid over-criminalising for the sake of preservation of 
sexual autonomy.38 Persuasion even is perfectly acceptable, as long as it can be set apart from 
coercion or active deception.39 We know which deceptions are declared as negating consent, but 
which might also lose the battle under section 74?40 How much truthfulness is needed for a genuine 
and valid consent? Herring argued that this should be a very high threshold: 
͞AgreeŵeŶt oďtained by deception is woefully insufficient. If a legal system is to rely on consent as a 
justification for what would otherwise be a grave wrong, it must demand consent in a rich sense: 
with full truthful understanding of what is involved and free from legitiŵate pressures͟.41 
However, the very fact that we now demand reasonable belief in consent, an objective measure, is 
already a higher threshold than the common law had required prior to the 2003 Act.42 This move 
towards recognising the importance of free agreement and the harms of abuse of trust has been 
applauded,43 without the need for further criminalisation based on divulging true feelings and 
intentions. This would be so far within the domain of personal relationships that the criminal law 
would have no legitimate role.44 Nevertheless, there is a question over how much you can withhold 
information from a sexual partner, and still claim to have reasonable belief that they are consenting 
to the act, without the knowledge to make an informed decision. Whether it is the use of protection, 
the possible transmission of a sexually transmitted disease, or biological gender at the time of the 
act, how much information is needed for valid consent? Does a transsexual who has not yet 
undergone a reassignment surgery, or a person infected with HIV, bear the burden of disclosure 
wholly because he has the most information in the situation?45 
Changes to Consent and the Conclusive Presumptions 
When we consider the change from an honest belief in consent that may be unreasonable, as per 
the Morgan precedent,46 to a reasonably held belief, we must also ask if this may fundamentally 
clash with deception on behalf of the accused. Deciding on belief in consent under section 74 
includes consideration of any steps taken by the accused to ascertain if the victim consents. If the 
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accused knows that the victim is not fully aware of what they are consenting to, or an aspect of the 
situation, and continues to withhold that information, then how can they be said to have taken the 
steps necessary to obtain a genuine consent from the victim?47 This idea of ͚iŶfoƌŵed ĐoŶseŶt͛ is 
rooted in the law of medical situations, but how far must it extend to sexual offenses?48 In stealthing 
cases, for example, the accused knows the victim may withdraw consent should they find out that 
the condom has been removed, so they withhold the information, to continue on the basis of an 
already obtained consent, now tainted by purposeful deception. It is obviously also questionable as 
to how a person in this situation has the freedom and the capacity to give consent, if they are 
uŶaǁaƌe that theǇ aƌe ĐoŶseŶtiŶg to uŶpƌoteĐted seǆ. AustiŶ desĐƌiďed a peƌsoŶ aĐtiŶg ͚fƌeelǇ͛ as 
oŶlǇ that theǇ had Ŷot aĐted ͚uŶfƌeelǇ͛,49 in that it merely rules out the suggestion of a pressure like 
duress. It is also difficult to say a person acts freely if they are lulled into a false sense of security 
about the act they are involved in, through a coercion they are not conscious of. The courts must 
decide if this is regrettable consent due to a change in the circumstances and facts of the act, or 
consent that is legally negated.50 Gƌoss desĐƌiďed seĐtioŶ ϳϲ as Ŷot ďeiŶg to ͚puŶish ŵeŶ͛s 
deceptioŶ͛ ďut to pƌoteĐt ǁoŵeŶ ͚ǁheŶ seǆ foƌ a puƌpose is pƌoposed͛,51 though not to protect 
against any humiliation or disappointment suffered because of bad judgment.52 
Reasonable belief must also be viewed in all of the circumstances, which leaves the possibility of 
sĐƌutiŶisiŶg the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ that ŵaǇ haǀe led to the ďelief held ďǇ the aĐĐused.53 Do they 
often partake in unprotected sex, for example? This fails to recognise that an important aspect of 
sexual autonomy is acknowledging saying yes to one act does not mean saying yes to all. The 
circumstances in which we view consent certainly get much more complicated when limited 
information, coupled with the aĐĐused͛s aǁaƌeŶess, is iŶǀolǀed.54 The libertarian view that consent 
must be fully informed to be valid, rather than a consent to the physical act alone that coincides that 
act, seems to be the least morally repugnant of the views. However, it is also a very high threshold 
not easily obtained, and crosses a line over having to disclose information which might be worthy as 
equal protection of sexual autonomy. For example, a transgender person having to disclose their 
biological sex at birth to any potential sexual partners and the point at which they have reached on 
their journey, would be criticised for promoting intolerance of transgender individuals.55 Since the 
case of McNally,56 deception as to gender has created much academic debate, whether this is a case 
for section 76 deception, or merely affects the victim͛s freedom to choose their sexual partner by 
gender,57 or choose their partner on any basis. As Spencer has described: 
͞EǀeŶ raĐists, surelǇ, are eŶtitled to ŵake their oǁŶ deĐisioŶs as to those to whom they wish to give 
theŵselǀes iŶ seǆ͟.58 
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Section 76 seems to be at the top of the hierarchy of the new consent rules,59 being the most 
heinous way of carrying out sexual relations which has no defence. Though it has been referred to as 
a ͚dƌaĐoŶiaŶ pƌoǀisioŶ͛,60 perhaps it is paramount ďeĐause it uses the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s oǁŶ deĐisioŶ-making 
powers against them.61 However, proving fraud or deception is only one aspect – as the Law 
Commission have noted, the prosecution need establish only non-consent, without the addition of 
evidencing fear, force or fraud.62 
Conditional Consent and Deception 
As discussed, the presence of a lie or undisclosed circumstance in an allegation of rape will rarely 
meet the threshold of section 76 deception, in that it is limited to the act to which it was said to 
apply.63 Though cases like Devonald have been helpful,64 the iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of ͚Ŷatuƌe oƌ puƌpose͛ is 
still vague. For example, does it cover the woman who tells her sexual partner she takes the 
contraceptive pill, but in fact does not, for the purpose of conceiving a child? If Gross͛s description of 
purpose is accurate, it may well be included: 
͞The Purpose of aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ is deterŵiŶed ďǇ ǁhat the person engaging in it intends to accomplish by 
it͟.65 
This can be read as a reference to the consequences of an act.66 Was the act for pregnancy, 
promotion, payment or perhaps merely gratification? Consummation of marriage could be 
interpreted as giving sex a purpose, but the common law approach to this excluded such 
deception.67 Is it questionable as to whether this precedent continues under the Sexual Offences Act 
2003. It ŵaǇ ďe that this is ĐoŶsideƌed a ƌeligious ͚puƌpose͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a seǆual oŶe. 
 Were nature and purpose singled out as lies that are more heinous because the act consented to is 
not the act done?68 Embellishing the truth to tempt others into sexual liaisons is certainly no new 
concept.69 The common law approach included mistake as to nature, but not mistake as to what 
would happened after the sexual act.70 If we continue with this precedent today, it seems that 
deception by one individual to another about feelings, emotions, or willingness to enter a 
relationship is certainly ruled out. What is even less clear is the operation of deception under section 
74, aŶd ǁhiĐh deĐeits ŵight affeĐt a ǀiĐtiŵ͛s fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐapaĐitǇ to Đhoose ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot to 
engage in sexual relations. Section 76 asks for intentional deception, so if a deception is instead 
considered under section 74, does this mean it does not have to be intentional? For a piece of 
legislation that was enacted to give clarity,71 we are still asking many questions. Aƌe ǁe to ask a ͚ďut 
foƌ͛ test; ďut foƌ the puƌposeful deĐeptioŶ of the aĐĐused, the ǀiĐtiŵ ǁould Ŷot haǀe ĐoŶseŶted?72 
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Deception as to gender is said to ĐhaŶge the ͚Ŷatuƌe͛ of the aĐt doŶe, aŶd if the aĐt doŶe is a 
facsimile of penile penetration, rightly so. However, it is questionable as to the extent this changes 
the nature of any other sexual acts between the accused and the victim, such as oral or digital 
peŶetƌatioŶ. This ŵaǇ ďe the poiŶt at ǁhiĐh ǁe ƌefeƌ ďaĐk to seĐtioŶ ϳϰ aŶd the failsafe of ͚fƌeedoŵ 
to Đhoose͛ ǁheŶ seĐtioŶ ϳϲ is Ŷot satisfied. However, if a victim in this situation is bisexual, it is 
questionable if the same infringement of freedom to choose will be applied.73 What other things 
ŵight eƋuallǇ ĐhaŶge the ͚Ŷatuƌe͛ of the aĐt? “tealthiŶg ĐhaŶges the leǀel of phǇsiĐal iŶtiŵacy 
between two individuals, but does this discrepancy between the act consented to and the act done 
change the ͚Ŷatuƌe͛ of the aĐt? Slater has suggested that nature should be limited to the physical, so 
the only two situations that would qualify are lack of a penis for penile penetration, or a naïve victim 
who believes penetration is for a non-sexual purpose.74 
Theƌe aƌe otheƌ ǁaǇs to defiŶe ͚Ŷatuƌe͛. We might also consider the level of harm done because of 
the change in the nature of the act. For a case of gender deception, this might be a great deal of 
psychological harm. For a case of stealthing, there are several physical outcomes that a victim may 
experience, including pregnancy and sexually transmitted infection. 
Does it matter if the deception is active or passive? Though it is speculated that only active 
deceptions have liability,75 whether the accused verbally lies or withholds information, there is 
equally a purpose. That purpose is to gain the consent of their sexual partner without knowledge 
that might affect that decision. A person need not know every detail about a person, or an 
encounter, but they do need to know that which is important to them in making their decision.76 If 
an individual specifies a condition to their involvement to sexual activity, and this is deceitfully 
agreed to by the other, we might ask if that is conditional consent or deception.  
Choice indicates options from which one may choose, and it is not possible to make an informed 
choice without information vital to the decision.77 The Law Commission commented that if an 
accused knows the victim has made a mistake, and he does not correct this, he cannot rely on 
consent as a defence.78 
Failed Cases and the Reliance on s74 
Although the conclusive presumptions about consent exist in theory, in reality cases involving 
deception often find convictions under the basic section 74 definition of consent. Perhaps this is a 
more preferable way of achieving justice, since the defendant has the opportunity to offer a defence 
that section 76 denies, as concurred by Hallet LJ in the case of Bingham.79 However, this overreliance 
may have an effect elsewhere, such as a reduction in judicial guidance for juries,80 or an abundance 
of appeals.81 If this is true, we might ask why section 76 is needed at all, other than to remind us of 
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which situations are most dire when it comes to genuinely given consent and the state of mind of 
the accused. Legal discourse certainly leans toward there being no compelling reason for either 
section 75 or 76.82  
A law student will learn of cases like Jheeta,83 F,84Bingham85 and Assange86 when studying this area 
of law, all of which were eventually convicted using section 74. This is not to say it has not been 
useful in other cases such as Devonald87 and McNally,88 but it is arguable that these cases would 
have found conviction under s74 regardless. Perhaps cases like these, where a deception prevents 
an informed decision, are exactly the type of case section 74 was intend to cover, and so reliance on 
section 76 is no wholly necessary.89 They deprive the victim of choice if the aspect of deceit is crucial 
to the act itself, or if it creates a fantasy that the victim believes.90 Despite that, there is a difference 
between believing a lie and relying on it to choose a course of conduct, and it is the latter situation 
that is problematic. Without this, it is hard to saǇ a ǀiĐtiŵ͛s seǆual autoŶoŵǇ is tƌulǇ Đoŵpƌoŵised.91 
In these cases, a defendant is not deceptive under section 76, but the victim is ͚not consenting for 
the purpose of section 74͛.92 It marks the difference between fundamental and non-fundamental 
mistakes making a moral contribution to the choice made.93 
Is Biological Deception About Nature and Purpose? Emotional Harm and the Freedom to Choose 
Much academic commentary seeks to distinguish between active deception,94 which is able to 
negate consent (at least under section 74) and non-disclosure, which is a much more slippery 
concept. For example, in the case R v B,95 the court noted in a HIV transmission case that it was one 
of non-disclosure rather than an outright lie, perhaps suggesting that the case may have been 
decided differently in other circumstances.96 In either situation, there seems to be a certain amount 
of deceptive behaviour on part of the accused, in that he is purposeful of his selective truth telling in 
order to achieve the outcome he wants. Perhaps it is mere luck as to whether he is asked about the 
particular circumstance and must lie about it. 
Cases of deĐeptioŶ as to a peƌsoŶ͛s ďiologiĐal seǆ aƌe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ diffiĐult. “haƌpe has ĐoŶĐluded that 
classifying such cases as McNally97 as obtaining consent to sexual activity by fraud is a violation of 
Article 8.98 If the accused, in particular a young person, is confused as to gender or identifies as 
transgender, it is difficult to balance this with the rights of the victim to choose with whom they are 
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sexually intimate. If the accused identifies as the opposite sex to that which they were assigned at 
birth, and having been living their life in line with that decision, is that evidence of lack of deception? 
If the court can establish that the accused person was aware the victim thought they were a 
different biological gender as to how the expressed themselves, and continued without correcting 
them, this will be proof enough to negate consent. The important question is, does this biological 
fraud really deceive the victim as to the nature of the act, or merely affect their ability to choose 
freely? This may depend on the act that takes place. When is disclosure mandatory, so as not to 
count as deception? There is little desire in such cases to humiliate the way the defendant in 
Devonald did,99 but does this make the defendant less culpable?100 
In the case of McNally, Justice Patrick said non-disclosure was a selfish abuse of trust.101 He has a 
poiŶt. It is foƌ the aĐĐused͛s gaiŶ, aŶd oŶlǇ theiƌ gain, if the reason for non-disclosure is that they are 
fully aware that the victim would be unlikely to consent if they knew the truth. The victim in McNally 
was heterosexual, and she wished to have a heterosexual encounter. McNally removed her authority 
to make that choice.102 However, McNally identified as male and indicated a wish to have surgery to 
reassign her biological sex, and may not have considered this as a fabrication at all until penile 
penetration was an issue. Much was made of the fact that McNally bought condoms, which 
indicated a purposeful and active deception on her part to trick the victim into believing she was 
biologically male. Sharpe has pointed out that this confuses the fundamental difference between 
impersonation and transgender,103 and in such cases active and passive deceptions must be 
distinguished in the interests of justice.104 Otherwise, we are punishing omissions without a legal 
duty to act though it does not live up to obligations of social responsibility.105 Nevertheless, the 
victim will feel equally violated whether the deception was active or passive,106 because it was 
knowing and purposeful. Both involve an awareness on the part of the accused. 
It is questionable if these legal rules are incompatible with recognised medical conditions such as 
body dysmorphia. Unfortunately, there is a real possibility of psychological harm for both the 
aĐĐused, ďǇ haǀiŶg to ƌeǀeal theǇ aƌe tƌaŶsgeŶdeƌ, aŶd the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s distƌess iŶ disĐoǀeƌiŶg the tƌuth 
after intimate encounters incongruous to their sexual orientation.107 Since surgery is not a condition 
for legal recognition of gender identity, but the Law Commission request surgery in order for there 
to be no deception, the water is muddied even more so.108 It is difficult to decide where we draw the 
line between gender fluid, identity confusion, and purposeful deceit. Should the assumptions of the 
heterosexual lead to convictions of the transgender? In an ideal world, everyone would be truthful 
about important aspects pertaining to sexual activity, but social preconceptions prevent much of this 
from being an easy task.109 Duty to disclose must be weighed against disproportionate interference 
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iŶto the aĐĐused͛s private life,110 but legal safeguards for emotional vulnerability and physical danger 
in sexual encounters are of equal importance.111 
Conditional Consent and the Risk of Physical Harm 
It is clear that frauds of nature are contrasted to frauds in inducement.112 In the first situation, 
meeting the criteria is factually impossible. Gender is therefore a characteristic that can negate 
consent.113 In the latter, it is not, but the accused makes it so. For example, promising a promotion. 
Does this also cover an agreement to use protection? The difference is that of additional intimacy 
and physical risk. Does the dishonesty in such situations, coupled with the risk to physical health, 
negate the possibility of reasonable belief in consent for stealthing cases? The deception makes the 
victim ignorant as to the risk of sexually transmitted disease and pregnancy (if the victim is female), 
and also creates a situation where there is more intimacy and skin-to-skin contact than the victim 
has authorised as part of the sexual encounter. In cases of transmission of HIV, grievous bodily harm 
is deemed the appropriate avenue for prosecution,114 but it is questionable if damage to health 
through purposeful deception in order to have consensual sexual intercourse should always be dealt 
with in this manner. 
While we may not be able to force someone to disclose such status for human rights issues,115 we 
ask that they deal with the consequences of their voluntary actions, knowing the possible 
consequences. Forced disclosure about the use of protection is much different a matter. How can 
one consent to a level of intimacy and risk of which one is unaware?116 If we hold someone accused 
of stealthing responsible only when they transmit a disease or cause pregnancy, this does not set a 
legal standard based on anything other than good or bad fortune. 
Consent must be both reasonably informed, and reasonably believed. If sex is for the purpose of 
gratification and enjoyment only, then a risk of procreation is outside the boundaries of the purpose 
of intercourse.117 This may not fit within purpose for section 76,118 but it may be enough to negate 
what the defendant could reasonably believe in circumstances where they kept their victim in the 
dark. An awareness of having protected sex is fundamentally different to an awareness of 
intercourse that is considered risky behaviour. It is correct to say this will continue outside of section 
ϳϲ, pƌesuŵptioŶs ďuilt to pƌoteĐt seǆual autoŶoŵǇ ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s health aŶd seleĐtiǀeŶess 
as to procreation.119 
Slater has proposed a new offence of non-disclosure, covering cases where there is non-disclosure of 
a material fact which includes risk of infection or the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s health ǁould ďe seƌiouslǇ affeĐted, that 
the accused is aware of and the victim is not.120 This a step further than use of section 20 bodily 
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harm121, as it finds culpable the risk taker without the need for physical harm. Though this was 
primarily aimed at HIV cases, a similar principle might be extended to stealthing cases.  
How does this relate to women who are fraudulent as to the use of the contraceptive pill? It seems 
to be deception as to the ͚puƌpose͛ of iŶteƌĐouƌse, ďut this is a deĐisioŶ that ƌelates oŶlǇ to 
pregnancy, rather than a risk to infection and a heightened level of contact and intimacy, as those 
risks have already been agreed to be taken. While we might call this reproduction without 
consent,122 and hold the father accountable for the child financially,123 the feŵale͛s ǁoƌd seeŵs to 
be a risk they are willing to take rather than use of sheath protection to be sure. 
Consent continues to cover cases of recklessness, where a defendant is reckless as to if the victim 
consents to the act or not. If a defendant removes the condom during the act, without ascertaining 
theiƌ paƌtŶeƌ͛s ǁishes, he is ƌeĐkless as to this. With the ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg aĐt also ďeiŶg Đapaďle of 
resulting in rape,124 this could be the point at which necessary mens rea is informed, and reasonable 
belief in consent is negated, even if such an act as removal had not been planned. At this point the 
risk of exposure to infection, pregnancy, violation of bodily autonomy and trust all become real.125 
WheŶ Ǉou Đoŵŵit a seǆual aĐt, Ǉou ďalaŶĐe ͞the ďeŶefits aŶd ƌisks of that ďehaǀiouƌ͟.126 It is 
impossible to do so if you are ignorant as to some of the information vital to the decision. 
The Removal of s3 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 clearly brought about some welcome changes in regards to consent. 
However, other changes were made, including the removal of section 3 Sexual Offences Act 1956.127 
This section covered the procurement of a woman under false pretences or representations in order 
to have sexual intercourse. This covered cases such as Williams, where the defendant was a married 
man, but told the victim he was single and free to marry her.128 In its absence, it has been said that 
the saviour of this is the broadness of section 74.129  
The Criminal Law Revision Committee had commented though section 3 was rarely used, it was very 
useful for situations where criminal liability was warranted, although not necessarily grave enough 
for rape.130 Under section 74, an accused would either have committed grave enough deceit as to 
haǀe affeĐted the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐapaĐitǇ to ĐoŶseŶt, oƌ fall shoƌt of the legal ďouŶdaƌies 
altogether and avoid any culpability. With this in mind, retaining the offence may have had some 
uses. Without it, deciding which cases of deception vitiate consent has become spectacularly 
important.131 The Law Commission had recommended continuing with its inclusion in the provisions, 
to avoid creating a lacuna,132 leaving the possibility of convicting and punishing less serious cases of 
deception. Is there where stealthing should fit? 
Conclusion 
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The area of consent becomes much less black and white where a lack of information is concerned, 
which the accused could provide to the victim, but does not. It remains a controversial issue.133 The 
ƌeĐeŶt ŵedia hǇpe oǀeƌ this ͚stealthiŶg͛ tƌeŶd has added to the deďate. There are even websites 
dediĐated to eǆplaiŶiŶg to ŵeŶ hoǁ this ĐaŶ ďe doŶe ǁithout theiƌ paƌtŶeƌ͛s aǁaƌeŶess. In 
California, this has been added to the definition of rape,134 which certainly sends a message to men 
about entitlement and sexual autonomy. HeƌƌiŶg͛s pƌogƌessiǀe ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs had a ǀeƌǇ Đleaƌ 
meaning; the law must require genuine and morally significant consent to truly protect sexual 
autonomy, which he termed as ƌeƋuiƌiŶg ĐoŶseŶt ͞iŶ a ƌiĐh seŶse͟.135 This is needed for consent to 
be seen as an agreement between equals.  
Though we have given statutory definition and more comprehension than the common law 
achieved, the broadness of section 74 has meant the jury retain a large amount of discretion.136  It 
could be said that judicial flexibility is necessary when dealing with the most extreme human 
behaviours.137 However, flexibility within consent and sexual offences may promote under-
enforcement, which would certainly speak for the low conviction rates.138 We may need a new 
version of the old section 3, which would assist juries in seeing the lack of informed consent in non-
violent situations.139 The danger is whether this would undermine the principle that sex without 
freely given consent is rape. It is also problematic from a labelling perspective, and could be seen the 
beginnings of gradation of non-consensual intercourse.140 Is this better than no punishment at all? 
What should the label be? The wrongdoing must be communicated without undermining the 
fundamental principle of sexual offences. 
Deception and Conditional Consent 
Freedom to choose seems to be a decidedly flexible concept, which has also been deemed as 
͞ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶglǇ ďƌoad͟.141 It does seem, at least from Assange, that in cases of deception that do not 
fit within section 76, the boundaries of liability are decided between lying and non-disclosure.142 This 
seems an inadequate way to set parameters for criminal liability,143 due to the role that luck plays. If 
a victim is very clear from the beginning of a sexual encounter as to the basis on which they are 
consenting, for example, using sheath protection, there is much to be said for this vitiating consent if 
it is a condition not complied with. Non-disclosure of removal during the act should not prevent 
conviction on the basis that the victim did not ask if the condom remained in place throughout 
penetration. After all, the active deception concept is flawed if the victim must first have known to 
ask the right question.144 
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The relation of this to biological gender is less straightforward. Sharpe referred to the situation of 
hoǁ geŶdeƌ is to ďe deteƌŵiŶed foƌ the puƌposes of deĐeptioŶ as ͞ƌeŵaiŶiŶg uŶĐleaƌ͟.145 How would 
a victim kŶoǁ to ƋuestioŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s ďiologiĐal geŶdeƌ? The defendant takes advantage of the 
ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ŵistake. Though HeƌƌiŶg͛s ideas foƌ ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌd iŶ this aƌea aƌe pƌogƌessiǀe, this 
comment effectively sums up cases of gender deception: 
͞RespeĐtiŶg a persoŶ’s sexual autonomy includes respecting that they are entitled to know the truth 
aŶd to ŵake aŶ iŶforŵed ĐhoiĐe aďout ǁhether to eŶgage iŶ seǆual iŶterĐourse͟.146 
Though this is difficult ground, perhaps we are looking at this through the wrong lens. Rather than 
being a case of deception as to biology, it may be viewed as implied conditional consent. The victim 
is consenting to what they think is a sexual encounter in line with their sexual orientation, and this is 
implicit. This requires their partner to meet the condition of being of a biological gender to fit with 
the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s seǆual oƌieŶtatioŶ. If these ĐoŶditioŶs aƌe Ŷot ŵet, aŶd theiƌ paƌtŶeƌ does Ŷot disĐlose 
this information, allowing the victim to proceed upon facts the accused knows not to be true, there 
is no true consent. 
This list of mistaken facts and non-disclosure in a sexual encounter could be endless.147 We cannot 
criminalise every lie told in order to seduce and tempt. Although many things will have relevance to 
a person in choosing a partner, such as marital status and religion,148 none more so than a gender 
that is compatible with their sexual orientation. Though we may make assumptions about the 
former, or even have expectations, for the latter it is implied that this is fundamental to a sexual 
encounter. 
We have some sympathy for cases like McNally. Many teens suffer a confusing time in discovering 
who they truly are through adolescence, and for LGBT teens this may be accompanied by feelings of 
shame and guilt.149 Unfortunately, this does not alter the fact that McNally knew her victim had 
made a presumption about biological sex that was essential to her agreement to engage in sexual 
iŶteƌĐouƌse. MĐNallǇ ďeiŶg ŵale ǁas aŶ iŵpliĐit ĐoŶditioŶ of the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s consent, and in such 
circumstances, of which McNally was aware, she could not have had reasonable belief that her 
victim was consenting to the act that took place.  It diƌeĐtlǇ iŶfƌiŶges the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ƌight to Đhoose 
their sexual preference, and so is in violation of section 74 consent – but at least using this clause, a 
defence can be argued. Biological gender is a material fact to consent, and it is difficult to argue a 
defendant took all reasonable steps to ascertain if the victim consented if they withheld such 
important information, but nevertheless a defence effort can be made under section 74. This is the 
reason why the Law Commission have speculated that consent would not be negated in the case of 
someone who has undergone gender reassignment surgery, as they now can biologically fit with the 
sexual orientation of their partner.150 
Guilty of Sexual Touching? 
Is protected sexual intercourse a material fact? For stealthing cases, moving forward is difficult, for 
an issue that is ǁidespƌead aŶd iŶǀolǀes little eǀideŶĐe otheƌ thaŶ the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s oǁŶ testimony. 
Should this deter criminalisation? As Herring states, sexual integrity should be protected even if 
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regularly violated.151 If a matter is not only essential to someone giving consent, but may also have 
repercussions as to physical health, this must be taken seriously. It is not regrettable consent after it 
is revealed the victim did not partake in protected sex. It is sex that would not have taken place at all 
had the victim known the circumstances, in order to protect their physical health. 
In addition to this, unprotected sex adds an additional amount of intimacy and skin-to-skin contact 
that the victim is unaware of. The Dica case proceeded as a section 20 offence because it was 
decided that the victim had consented to sex but not to contracting a disease.152 At the very least, 
perhaps the stealthing trend should be guilty of sexual touching. 
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